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Abstract—Push notification services provide reliable, energy
efficient, store-and-forward messaging between servers and
clients. This mode of communication is widely used, and
sufficiently compelling for mobile devices that push notification
services are integrated into operating systems. Unfortunately,
push notification services today allow the service provider
to practice censorship, surveillance, and location tracking.
We explore whether running a Tor hidden service from a
smartphone offers a viable, privacy-aware alternative. We
conduct empirical measurements in the lab as well as modelling
using data from 2 014 handsets in the Device Analyzer dataset.
We estimate the monthly median cost of cellular data required
to support a Tor hidden service from a smartphone at 198 MiB.
We further estimate that the network activity would cost at
least 9.6% of total battery on a Nexus One device with a
daily charging cycle and connected to the Internet via 3G. We
explore four strategies for reducing cellular data costs which,
when combined, could potentially reduce the total monthly
median cost to 61 MiB.
I. INTRODUCTION
Push notification services provide reliable, energy ef-
ficient, store-and-forward messaging between servers and
clients. This mode of communication is sufficiently com-
pelling for mobile devices that push notification services
are integrated into operating systems. For example, Google
Cloud Messaging (GCM) is embedded into Android through
the Google Play Services API. GCM is also available as
a library for developers of iOS apps and developers of
extensions for the Chrome web browser. Consequently, push
notification services are widely used by apps to support both
device-to-device communication (e.g. sending and receiving
messages between users of a social media app) as well as
supporting information dissemination (e.g. news apps and
sports score apps).
Push notifications provide app writers and client device
owners with four advantages: first, if the client device is
switched off, or temporarily disconnected from the Inter-
net, the push notification service will store messages and
deliver them when the device is next online; second, push
notification software on the client initiates a single long-
lived TCP connection from the client device to the service,
avoiding issues with NAT and firewalls as well as removing
the need to poll servers periodically for updates; third,
multiple messages destined for a variety of apps on a single
client device can be coalesced temporally and multiplexed
down a single TCP connection, saving battery life and
improving performance; finally, an app server can achieve
service fan-out by sending a single copy of a message to a
push notification service and requesting that the message is
delivered to many devices on a group or topic basis.
There are downsides to push notifications however. From
a privacy perspective, a push notification service has the
disadvantage that the service can see the sender and the
recipient of every notification across a broad range of apps
and thus may conduct surveillance and censorship. While
data is encrypted between the app server and the notification
service, and between the notification service and the handset,
there is no requirement for it to be encrypted end-to-end.
Therefore, app data can often be read by the push notification
server. In addition, regardless of support for end-to-end
encryption between an app server and a handset, metadata
on which handsets use which apps, as well as the location
of the user (e.g. via the handset’s IP address), are revealed
to the notification service.
In this paper we explore the design space of more privacy-
friendly designs for push notification services. We consider
three broad options: use push notification services as de-
ployed today; connect to a single push notification service
via Tor; or run a separate push notification service per app
and connect to each of these via Tor. In the latter two
cases, connections via Tor could be made outbound from
the phone to the service or to a Tor hidden service running
on a smartphone. We discuss details of these designs, and
the trade-offs they represent, in Section III after we review
the background on Tor and its support for hidden services
in Section II.
A key requirement for mobile devices is careful manage-
ment of battery energy and cellular data usage. We therefore
measure the data usage costs of using Tor and running a
Tor hidden service on an Android handset. We do this by
breaking down the costs of running a Tor hidden service into
components that allow us to produce a model of data usage
as a function of the connectivity profile of a handset. By
using connectivity data, such as the availability of WiFi and
cellular data from 2 014 handsets in the Device Analyzer [1]
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dataset, we estimate the cellular data usage of running a Tor
hidden service on an Android device. We find that running a
Tor hidden service today costs the median Device Analyzer
user 198 MiB per month in cellular data usage, and the top
10% of devices in excess of 362 MiB (and at e 0.20 per
MiB, e 72.40 per month). Using EnergyBox [2] we estimate
cellular data usage costs 9.6% of battery charge for a Nexus
One device with a daily charge cycle.
The cellular data costs of running a Tor hidden service are
significant. We therefore explore four strategies to reduce
costs, making push notification services over Tor more
attractive. By combining these strategies, we are able to
reduce the costs of running a Tor hidden service for the
median Device Analyzer device to 61 MiB per month.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the costs and benefits of using Tor to
improve the privacy of push notification services for mobile
devices, we start with a brief summary of Tor. The Tor
network is composed of clients, which generate and consume
traffic, including smartphones, laptops, or desktops; and
servers, called relays, which forward traffic to other relays
and make connections to the public Internet on behalf of
clients. To use the Tor network, clients download the latest
network status document approximately every 90 minutes,
which lists information about around 7 000 Tor relays cur-
rently available worldwide. The network status document
is managed by a small number of more trusted servers,
called directory authorities, who vote on a consensus of
its contents once an hour. The directory authorities publish
additional, relatively static, information on relays in relay
descriptors every 18 hours. After downloading the network
status document, clients download any relay descriptors
mentioned in that document that the client does not already
have. The client also downloads certificates of authorities
where it does not already have a current one.
Clients use relays to build circuits through a sequence
of (typically three) relays. Such circuits support an overlay
network between the client and the final public Internet
service required. The client applies layers of encryption in
such a way that none of the relays, nor the final Internet ser-
vice, is able to determine which devices on the Tor network
are connecting to which Internet services. Because circuit
construction takes time, clients proactively build circuits
in anticipation of any requirement for data connectivity;
circuits can also support multiple concurrent TCP streams.
Tor clients periodically send keep-alive messages on idle
open connections to prevent the connection from expiring
at any intermediate routers. The default interval between
keep-alive messages is currently 5 minutes. To improve the
privacy properties of Tor, circuits are (at least partially)
rebuilt every 10 minutes.
A. Tor hidden services
In addition to supporting clients connecting to services
such as websites on the public Internet, Tor also allows
Tor clients to publish hidden services. A hidden service
is identified by an onion address, which represents the
first 16 characters of a base32-encoded SHA1 hash of
a public key generated by the client. Onion addresses
are long-lived identifiers, distributed through some out-of-
band mechanism between parties who wish to communi-
cate. For example, Facebook offers a Tor hidden service
at https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/.1 An onion
address allows Tor clients to establish circuits with the
hidden service using the Tor rendezvous protocol, and there-
fore transfer data to and from the service over the Tor
network. The design of Tor hidden services prevents any
single relay from learning the IP address associated with
an onion address, therefore providing anonymity to both a
hidden service provider and its clients.
The rendezvous protocol is described below, where we
assume that Bob wants to run a hidden service and Alice
wants to connect to it. A reasonably detailed understanding
of these steps is required in order to understand the network
and energy costs presented in later sections of the paper.
Bob creates a hidden service:
1) Bob asks his Tor client to create a new hidden service.
This generates a public-private key pair for the service.
The public key of the service identifies the service and
is used to generate an onion address.
2) Bob shares his onion address with Alice via an out-of-
band mechanism.
Bob runs a hidden service:
3) Bob’s Tor client chooses a small number of (typi-
cally three) relays as introduction points. Bob then
establishes a circuit to each introduction point and
sends a single-use public key, or service key, and signs
a message to prove he is the owner of this public
key.2 Bob’s Tor client must keep the circuits to the
introduction points open while the service is running
to receive connection requests from new clients.
4) Bob’s Tor client generates a service descriptor contain-
ing the public key, the service key, and the introduction
points. The service descriptor is uploaded to a few (cur-
rently six) hidden service directories, chosen based on
the descriptor ID, which is a hash of the service’s public
key, the current date and time, and other deterministic
data. Bob’s Tor client publishes a new descriptor once
an hour, or whenever its content changes.
1Note: Facebook have spent considerable computational resource to final
a public key whose base32-encoded SHA1 is memorable.
2Earlier versions used the public key of the hidden service instead of a
single-use service key, but this allowed the introduction point to monitor
Bob’s activity.
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Alice connects to Bob’s hidden service:
5) Alice’s Tor client determines the set of hidden service
directories responsible for Bob’s key using his onion
address and the current time, and retrieves Bob’s service
descriptor from one of them.
6) Alice’s Tor client establishes a rendezvous point. It does
so by randomly choosing a Tor relay, building a circuit
to it, and asking it to act as a rendezvous point, speci-
fying a randomly chosen 20-byte rendezvous cookie.
7) Alice’s Tor client connects to one of Bob’s introduction
points and requests an introduction to Bob by pro-
viding a hash of Bob’s service key. Alice also sends
a rendezvous request, including the address of the
rendezvous point, the rendezvous cookie, and the first
part of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, all encrypted
under Bob’s temporary service key.
8) The introduction point forwards the rendezvous request
to Bob. Bob checks the request is valid and not a replay.
9) Bob’s Tor client creates a new circuit to the rendezvous
point chosen by Alice and asks the rendezvous relay
to complete a circuit to Alice. Bob’s request contains
the rendezvous cookie, the second part of the Diffie-
Hellman exchange, and a handshake digest. The ren-
dezvous point forwards the latter two to Alice’s Tor
client. Alice’s Tor client checks that the handshake is
valid, and both sides derive a new set of keys. A new
circuit is now established between Bob and Alice.
10) Alice can now establish one or more TCP connections
over her circuit with Bob.
III. PUSH NOTIFICATIONS OVER TOR
We now consider three overall designs: push notification
services as deployed today; connection to a single push noti-
fication service via Tor; running a separate push notification
service per app and connect to each of these via Tor.
Connecting to a single push notification service may
be more energy efficient than using one push notification
service per app since separate messages from multiple app
servers (likely destined for a variety of apps on the same
handset) can be coalesced into a batch for delivery in a single
Tor circuit. The downside is that the push notification service
learns the app servers (and therefore apps) communicating
with a single handset, although it does not necessarily know
the identity or location of the handset if such communication
is sent over Tor.
Running a hidden service on a smartphone does not, at
first glance, appear to provide much benefit over the use of
an outbound Tor connection to a push notification service.
Importantly, however, hidden services allow app developers
to avoid using a push notification service at all if the aim of
the app is to share data between client devices.
Mobile devices typically sit behind a NAT or firewall.
Thus, direct phone-to-phone communication is often difficult
or impossible. If every device operates a Tor hidden service,
direct communication between two smartphones is now pos-
sible, as an onion address is globally unique and accessible.
The downside to this approach is that both the sending and
receiving smartphone need to be online simultaneously for
data to flow. This requires careful scheduling of smartphones
to wake from low-power states and both devices to have
network connectivity at the same time. We note that an
energy- and data-efficient solution is likely a prerequisite
for mobile apps that use device-to-device communication
(e.g. messaging apps). We therefore focus on data and
energy issues of Tor hidden services. We leave the issue
of scheduling communication between devices for future
work, although such issues have been addressed before.
For example, the PEN network supported direct peer-to-peer
communication, with a scheduling algorithm that was more
efficient than the more traditional (centralized) master-slave
scheme [3, p. 21].
Both connecting to push notification services via Tor,
and the use of Tor hidden services, inherit the anonymity
properties of Tor, which is resistant to local adversaries who
are able to control any local network. This means that a local
adversary does not learn the endpoints of any connections.
In addition, the app server may also be located behind a
hidden service, providing anonymity for the app server too.
Regardless of whether we use a single push notification
server, a push notification service per app, or phone-to-phone
communication, our primary concern is that using Tor, and
possibly running a Tor hidden service, may be significantly
less energy-efficient, or may result in substantially more data
usage, than traditional push notification services. Quantify-
ing and improving the cost of Tor is a requirement in all
three use-cases and is thus the focus of the remainder of
this paper.
We note that the use of Tor to support push notifications
may increase latency for message delivery, but we do not
believe the typical latency times found on Tor will lead to
large problems for push notifications. We therefore leave this
analysis as an area of future work.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We present a series of experiments to measure data usage
requirements and to estimate the energy consumption of us-
ing Tor and operating a Tor hidden service on smartphones.
Our testbed consists of two Nexus 5X smartphones running
Cyanogenmod (Android 6.0.1). To support the creation and
operation of Tor hidden services, we developed a simple cus-
tom app that uses Tor project’s Orbot Android app (version
15.1.2) to run a hidden service. Our app accepts connections
to the hidden service and logs any data sent to it, allowing
us to explore data transmission at various rates between the
smartphone and another computer. To avoid problems with
the phone going into deep sleep, we configured the phone to
always stay awake. To provide a comparison with Google’s
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Cloud Messaging (GCM) service, we installed and enabled
the Google Play Services Framework when necessary.
We obtained full packet traces of all traffic on a Linux
workstation by connecting the smartphones to a NETGEAR
WiFi access point with an Ethernet uplink connected to a
workstation. The workstation was configured to route data
onto the wider Internet, allowing connections to and from the
Tor network and GCM. The experiments where conducted
between December 2016 and February 2017.
A. Measuring Tor traffic
To estimate the cost of using Tor for push notifications, we
wanted to construct an empirical model of Tor traffic. Such
a model is important for accurately estimating the data and
energy costs an app might generate using any of the Tor-
based push notification systems we discussed in Section III.
As discussed in Section II, the Tor client takes part in
many different network activities which we break down into
nine categories in order to build an empirical model: regular
downloads of the network status; relay (micro) descriptor
data; creating circuits to introduction points; regular uploads
of hidden service descriptors; sending keep-alive messages
along established connections to Tor relays; downloading
authority certificates; measuring circuit timeouts; establish-
ing and closing connections to a (first hop) Tor relay; and
creating circuits, responding to connection requests, and data
communication associated with a hidden service.
In this section we describe how we quantify the amount of
network traffic in each above categories. We use this analysis
in Section VI to derive an empirical model of Tor data usage
and assess the real-world impact of using Tor with handsets
in the Device Analyzer project.
Tor traffic is encrypted, and thus it is not straightforward
to obtain a breakdown of traffic by category. We therefore
instrumented the Tor source code to identify and log the
purpose (thus category) of all network data sent or received
by the Tor client. We used the log to associate this category
with each packet in the network trace captured by the
workstation.
Tor clients and routers communicate with one another
via TLS connections with ephemeral keys. Traffic on these
connections consist of 514-byte cells, which contain a header
and a payload. Cells are either control cells, used to create,
extend, or destroy a circuit, or are payload cells, containing
encrypted data travelling over an existing circuit. The cir-
cuits themselves are used to support connectivity for client
applcations (e.g. allowing an app on the phone to make a
TCP connection to a push notification service) and maintain
connectivity to the Tor network (e.g. downloading network
status; uploading a hidden service descriptor; sending a
keep-alive message; and so on).
Our instrumented Tor client generally allows us to deter-
mine the purpose of each cell sent or received, but associat-
ing this with the network trace captured by the workstation
is difficult because: multiple cells may be carried inside
a single IP packet; a single cell may be split across an
IP packet; and TLS handshake messages, TLS headers,
TCP headers and TCP re-transmissions introduce additional
overhead that should be associated with the underlying
category of use.
Accounting for the TCP header size and re-transmissions
is relatively easy as these are visible in the packet trace.
To account for TLS headers and overheads, we record
the number of bytes read and written to the TLS stream
and to the underlying TCP socket. We match the byte
counts written to the TCP socket with the bytes sent in the
network trace to determine which cells (or parts of cells)
are contained within a specific network trace. The overheads
resulting from TLS and TCP are assigned proportionally to
the cells contained within the relevant packets.
Determining the purpose of each cell is generally straight-
forward since the cell header associates the cell with a
specific circuit, and additional instrumentation allows us to
record the current purposes of a circuit or of the stream asso-
ciated with the cell. One complication is that the assignment
of a purpose to a cell cannot be made directly after data is
read from the underlying TLS connection, since only part
of a cell may be returned. Additional bookkeeping is thus
needed so that the purpose can be determined after complete
cells have been received and parsed. Another difficulty is that
many TCP streams can be multiplexed down a single circuit.
For circuits that were used for more than one purpose, there
can exist some traffic that cannot be assigned to a particular
TCP stream (e.g. creating a new circuit); if the purpose
cannot be uniquely inferred, the traffic cost is shared equally
between all the purposes associated with the circuit.
Consequently, there are two approximations in our analy-
sis that are small and therefore do not have a material impact
on our analysis. First, since Tor preemptively builds circuits,
some of these circuits may not have been used; we find
unused circuits were responsible for only 0.1% of the total
traffic. Second, when cells cannot be associated with a TCP
stream, and their purpose cannot be inferred, we assign their
cost equally to all purposes associated with a given circuit;
this only affected 0.2% of the total traffic. Section V-A offers
more details.
V. RESULTS
We now report on four experiments. First we measure
the cost of maintaining a Tor hidden service for a fixed IP
address and stable Internet connection. Second, we measure
the additional cost of changing our IP address, a regular
occurrence for a smartphone as it moves between cellular
data and WiFi networks. Third, we explore the overhead of
data transmission across the Tor network. These results allow
us to produce a model of the cost of running a Tor hidden
service, something we build on in Section VI. Finally, for
comparison, we measure the overheads of using GCM.
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A. Hidden service maintenance
We measured the network traffic induced by maintaining
a Tor hidden service over a 48-hour period using our testbed.
We recorded 32.5 MiB of Tor traffic, including IP headers
across 46,790 packets, or an average of 693 KiB (975
packets) per hour. The large majority of the traffic volume
in bytes was caused by network status consensus downloads
(79.9%), with another 11.7% caused by hidden service
descriptor uploads. Downloading relay descriptors caused
4.3% of the traffic, keep-alive messages 2.5%, and intro-
duction circuits 0.2%. Establishing and closing connections
to entry (first hop) relays was responsible for 0.8% of the
traffic. 0.2% was used to measure circuit timeouts, another
0.2% to fetch authority certificates, and the remaining 0.1%
was used to manage circuits that remained unused. Table I
provides further detail.
At the time of writing, directory authorities vote on a
new network status consensus every hour, which is valid
for three hours. Clients download a new consensus at a
randomly chosen time between 105 and 170.6 minutes after
their current consensus becomes valid. We observed a total
of 38 consensus downloads, with an average size of 699±9
KiB. In addition, we saw one case where the directory server
returned a “304 Not modified” status. In this case, the client
retried the download after one minute, resulting in the same
status code. When the client tried again at a different server
10 minutes later, it received a full consensus document again.
This caused an additional 8 KiB of traffic. We also observed
336 hidden service descriptor uploads. Keep-alive messages
are padded to the size of a cell, with the total size of keep-
alive IP packets as 595 bytes, which is answered by an ACK
packet of 52 bytes. Both sides of the connection send a
keep-alive packet, resulting in 4 packets and 1 294 bytes
exchanged per idle connection every 5 minutes.
Type of traffic KiB/h KiB% Pkts/h Pkts%
Network status download 554 79.9% 694 71.2%
Relay descriptors 30 4.3% 47 4.9%
HS descriptor 82 11.7% 144 14.8%
Keep-alive 17 2.5% 54 5.6%
Introduction circuits 1 0.2% 3 0.3%
First-hop connections 6 0.8% 24 2.5%
Measure circuit timeout 2 0.2% 3 0.3%
Authority certificate 2 0.2% 3 0.3%
Unused circuits 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Total 693 100% 975 100%
Table I
AVERAGE NETWORK TRAFFIC GENERATED WHEN MAINTAINING A TOR
HIDDEN SERVICE.
B. Network connectivity changes
Smartphones regularly change their network connectivity
as they move between WiFi access points and connections
via cellular data services. Whenever such device connec-
tivity changes, connections to the Tor network must be re-
established because the source IP address used to support
the TCP connections underlying Tor circuits changes.
To estimate the total additional network traffic caused by
network connectivity changes, we used the same setup as
in the maintenance experiment in Section V-A, but forced
a disconnect of the WiFi connection every 20 minutes, and
a reconnect 5 seconds later. When Orbot detects that the
network is down, Tor shuts down all connections and starts
rebuilding connections when connectivity is back.
We then measured the amount of traffic generated over 48
hours and classified it as in Section V-A. Our experiments
showed that network status document and relay descriptor
downloads were not affected by connectivity changes. We
therefore exclude traffic classified as one of these categories.
The current implementation of Orbot chooses new introduc-
tion points after each reconnect, and re-uploads the hidden
service descriptors. Based on Section V-A, which describes
the traffic required for a set of hidden service descriptor
uploads, we also exclude traffic related to them to get an
estimate of the remaining traffic caused by a connectivity
change. Ignoring traffic related to these three activities, we
calculated the difference in total traffic compared to the idle
connection (Section V-A). Excluding these, we measured
5 628 KiB of traffic, compared to 1 362 KiB for the idle
connection. During the 48 hour period, the WiFi reconnected
143 times. We therefore estimate an average additional traffic
per reconnect of 29.8 KiB, primarily for re-establishing
connections, introduction circuits, and other circuits. Adding
the approximately 70 KiB it takes to upload hidden service
descriptors, a reconnect generates roughly 100 KiB of traffic.
C. Data transmission
We measured the overhead of transmitting data over the
Tor network. To do so, we sent messages of three different
sizes (1 B, 512 B and 1 KiB) at three different intervals
(1 min, 8 min, 12 min) to the smartphone. We chose 8 and
12 minute intervals to explore the effect of circuit rebuilds,
which currently occur every 10 minutes (Section II). For
each message, we established a fresh TCP connection to the
hidden service and sent a stream of bytes of the given length
before closing the connection. For each combination, we
sent messages for 4 hours. Table II shows how much traffic
was generated on average by a single message for different
message sizes and rates. We estimated this amount by
counting all traffic not labeled as network status download,
relay descriptor download, hidden service descriptor upload,
certificate authority download, or measuring circuit timeout
over the 4 hour-period, subtracting the expected amount of
traffic for the same categories for simply maintaining the
hidden service as measured in Section V-A (429 bytes/1.4
packets per minute), and dividing by the number of messages
sent. Note that we count keep-alive traffic, as receiving
messages may reduce or increase the need for keep-alive
messages.
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Interval 1 B 512 B 1 KiB
1 min 2.7(7.6) 3.2(7.8) 3.8(9.2)
8 min 5.7(15.7) 6.1(16.4) 7.2(19.6)
12 min 9.1(25.1) 9.9(26.7) 9.7(25.4)
Table II
THE AVERAGE ADDITIONAL NETWORK TRAFFIC IN KIB (NUMBER OF
PACKETS IN BRACKETS) GENERATED PER MESSAGE OVER TOR FOR
DIFFERENT MESSAGE SIZES AND DIFFERENT SENDING RATES.
D. Comparison with GCM
For comparison with Tor, we used our testbed to measure
the costs of maintenance, connectivity changes, and message
overhead of using GCM. To determine the traffic relevant to
GCM, we filtered TCP traffic from the smartphone whose
destination was mtalk.google.com, ports 5228–5230.
Push notifications over GCM requires Google Play Ser-
vices (PS) running on the handset. PS initiates and maintains
a single open TCP connection to a GCM server to receive
push notifications. To keep the connection alive, PS periodi-
cally sends keep-alive messages to a GCM server. The active
keep-alive intervals can be determined by typing the code
*#*#426#*#* in the Phone app. Using this technique, we
experimentally confirmed that, for mobile data connections,
PS currently uses a 28-minute interval. On WiFi, PS uses
a proprietary adaptive algorithm to determine an interval of
between 110 seconds and 29 minutes; in our case the interval
was typically set to 19, 24, or 29 minutes.
There are no entries in the smartphone system log con-
cerning keep-alive messages. Thus, to quantify data usage
and packet count for keep-alive messages, we looked at
the packet trace from the smartphone deployed with our
testbed with PS installed and enabled. To ensure that PS
connected to GCM and waited for push notifications, we
wrote and launched a simple app that waits for incoming
GCM messages. We observed a periodic burst of three or
four packets with a total length between 224 and 278 bytes,
which matched the WiFi heartbeat interval. From the 246
bursts we observed, the average total size was 238±22 bytes
(not counting duplicate packets). Alongside this periodic
burst, we sometimes observed up to four additional packets
containing duplicate TCP packets (up to 528 bytes in total).
The contents of the packets were encrypted so we could
not determine further details of the keep-alive message or
the purpose of the retransmission. The average total size
including duplicate packets was 258± 57 bytes.
We repeated the experiment described in Section V-B for
GCM on a Nexus 5X handset. We again forced the phone to
reconnect to WiFi every 20 minutes. We ran the experiment
for 48 hours. We measured the amount of traffic within a
minute after each reconnect and observed a burst of traffic,
with an average size of 2.9±1.5 KiB (16.8±1.6 packets) in
141 out of 143 cases when the phone reconnected to WiFi.
In two cases, we observed no additional traffic directly after
a reconnect. We assume that the fact that we did not change
the IP address might have resulted in PS not reconnecting
in these cases.
To measure the traffic overhead when sending messages
to the smartphone, we sent similar messages to our GCM-
enabled app as we did over Tor in Section V-C. We used the
same message sizes and intervals (1 min, 8 min, 12 min; 1 B,
512 B and 1 KiB) and we measured each combination for 2
hours. The average traffic per message did not significantly
differ for different intervals. Per 1-byte message we observed
on average 0.3 KiB, per 512-byte message 0.8 KiB, and per
1024-byte message 1.3 KiB of traffic.
VI. TOR HIDDEN SERVICE MODEL
In this section, we use the results of Section V to derive
a model for the data usage of a hidden service on a
smartphone. We use this model to evaluate the data usage
and energy costs of using Tor to support a push notification
service on real devices in Section VI-A. The model is based
on the results from our measurements and therefore on the
current state of the Tor network. Future work could take into
account the changing nature of the Tor network and create
a model that depends on parameters like the number of Tor
relays that notably impact the amount of network traffic.
To estimate the total network traffic required to maintain
the hidden service on a phone, we require knowledge of the
connectivity profile of a device: the periods the device was
connected to the Internet via WiFi or a cellular network,
when the IP address of the handset changes, and when
no network connectivity is available. Network traffic is
generated by periodic network status and relay descriptor
downloads, hidden service descriptor uploads, and the cre-
ation and maintenance of Tor circuits to introduction points.
We look at each of these in turn.
The network status document is downloaded at regular
intervals. Building on our analysis in Section V-A, we
assume that the Tor client starts a network status download
when either: a disconnected device connects to the Internet
and has no valid network status document; or time t (chosen
uniformly at random from the interval [105, 170.6] minutes)
has passed since their current download became valid. We
assume that a new network status document becomes valid
on the hour, every hour (in UTC) and the client always
downloads the most recent valid document. We assume that
each consensus download produces 716 419 bytes of traffic,
the average measured in Section V-A.
We assume that the client downloads a set of relay
descriptors immediately after it downloads a network status
document. We assume that this requires 30 356 · h bytes of
traffic, where h is the number of hours that have passed
since the last network status download. This is based on the
average descriptor download traffic we observed per hour,
and should give a good approximation, in particular because
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the large majority of descriptor downloads happens shortly
after a network status download.
We assume that each time the phone changes the way
it connects to the Internet, it needs to rebuild its Tor con-
nections and circuits (including the ones to the introduction
points), which costs 30 548 bytes of traffic, the average
measured in Section V-B.
We assume that the client uploads its hidden service
descriptor immediately after it has (re-)established its con-
nections to the introduction points, or 60 minutes after
the last upload. We assume that each set of uploads (to
six directories) incurs 71 504 bytes of traffic, the average
measured in Section V-A.
Finally, we assume that for every 5 minutes the device is
connected to the Internet, 1 474 bytes of keep-alive traffic
is generated, the average measured in Section V-A. We do
not include periodic changes of the introduction points, as
these have a small impact on total traffic (0.2% during the
experiment described in Section V-A) and in our analysis,
the Tor client changes introduction points once a day.
Similarly, for simplicity, we do not include other traffic in
our model since the remaining traffic was only about 1% of
the total traffic during our measurement.
A. Evaluation
To evaluate the energy and data usage costs of using
Tor to support push notifications, we use our model from
Section VI together with connectivity profile data of smart-
phones from the Device Analyzer project [1].
Device Analyzer is an Android app, available on the
Google Play Store since May 2011 and installed on over
30 000 handsets. It gathers information on a wide variety
of system statistics, including: app usage; metadata on calls
placed and received; metadata on text messages sent and
received; Bluetooth devices seen and connected to; WiFi ac-
cess points seen and connected to; cell network coverage for
calls and data; and battery and power usage. Data collected
by the app is processed on the handset to obscure direct
personal identifiers (e.g. phone numbers) before uploading
data to a server at the University of Cambridge.
We analyzed traces from the 30 444 devices in the Device
Analyzer dataset. We excluded all devices with less than
30 days’ worth of data. We further excluded all devices
where Device Analyzer data collection has been interrupted
at any point, had large jumps in their device clock, or
where the device clock was obviously wrong or broken.
For each device trace from the remaining 2 014 devices, we
estimate the volume of cellular data required to maintain a
Tor hidden service. We do this by assuming that cellular data
is used when a cellular connection is available and a WiFi
connection is not. Since the Tor client uses timing randomi-
sation when downloading the network status document, we
simulate the connectivity pattern of the device 40 times and
take the average amount of traffic.
The baseline box plot shown in Figure 1 shows our esti-
mate of the cost of running a Tor hidden service for 30 days
on the 2 014 devices from the Device Analyzer dataset. An
equivalent numeric summary is shown in Table III. Cellular
data usage is high, with a median cost across all devices
of 198 MiB. For 10% of the devices we estimate a cellular
data usage of 362 MiB or more. These are high data rates,
and in most countries will require a significant data plan.
For exposition purposes, assuming networks charge e 0.20
per MiB, the maximum roaming charge mobile operators
within the EU were allowed to charge after March 2014, this
represents e 72.40 per month; a substantial price to pay for
better privacy. By way of comparison, GCM maintenance,
without any IP address changes, costs on average 258 bytes
every time it needs to send a heartbeat (see Section V-D), or
0.44 MiB over 30 days for heartbeat interval of 24 minutes.
Even factoring in multiple network changes per day, at
2.9 KiB per change, total costs are still likely only a couple
of MiB per month.
We use EnergyBox [2] to estimate the energy costs of
maintaining a Tor hidden service on a smartphone. Ener-
gyBox takes a packet trace, a smartphone model, and a
connectivity profile (WiFi or cellular). To provide a reason-
able lower-bound estimate for the energy costs, we reused
the 48-hour packet trace collected for our experiment in
Section V-A and assumed this trace was transferred over the
cellular data network (3G) with a Nexus One device on the
TeliaSonera network, the only device and network operator
the EnergyBox authors provide an energy model for. The
Nexus One was released in 2010, and we expect newer
devices’ batteries to last longer. Over the 48-hour period,
the estimated total energy costs were 5 346 J; or 2 673 J
= 0.743 Wh per day. The Nexus One device has a battery
capacity of 5.18 Wh, so, assuming a battery profile where
the device is charging for 8 hours over night and on battery
for 16 hours, this represents 9.6% of total battery capacity
– a significant amount. Note that this value only takes into
account the energy required for network communication, and
additional power is required to make a hidden service work,
e.g., to keep the device awake when needed.
B. Reducing Tor data usage
The above numbers demonstrate that running a Tor hidden
service on a smartphone generates several hundreds of
megabytes of cellular data traffic per month on a typical
device, an unacceptable volume for all but those with a
generous data package. As the EnergyBox paper [2] demon-
strates, there is a strong correlation between data volume and
energy usage too. Therefore, we evaluate four strategies to
reduce the amount of data Tor requires, thereby reducing
energy usage. Note that these strategies may potentially
































Figure 1. Estimated traffic over the cellular network over 30 days for
2 014 devices in the Device Analyzer dataset. The leftmost box shows a
data usage estimate for Orbot’s current behaviour; the remaining boxes
estimate data usage with various data reduction strategies developed in
Section VI-B.
Base A B C BC D ABCD
Median 198 165 172 169 154 95 61
Mean 367 305 333 322 304 188 119
Std.dev. 141 108 138 132 132 101 45
90th perc. 362 341 353 329 327 172 120
99th perc. 649 424 628 612 607 517 202
Table III
ESTIMATED TRAFFIC IN MIB OVER THE CELLULAR NETWORK OVER 30
DAYS FOR 2 014 DEVICES IN THE DEVICE ANALYZER DATASET.
Strategy A: Reconnect to the same introduction points:
In the version of Tor client we used in our experiments, Tor
chose a new set of introduction points whenever a device
changed its IP address. This is supposed to be fixed [4].
However, we found that changes in network connections
continued to require new introduction points. At the time
of writing, Tor developers were working on a fix [5].
Changing introduction points requires the Tor client to
generate a new hidden service descriptor and upload it. This
causes additional traffic, and also affects anyone wanting to
connect to the hidden service: other clients may have cached
the hidden service descriptor and therefore connectivity is
broken. A fix is under development [6].
Strategy A in Figure 1 estimates the data usage costs
for a Tor client that reconnects to the same introduction
points when the IP address of the smartphone changes, and
therefore does not need to re-upload the hidden service
descriptor.
Strategy B: Proactively fetch network status on WiFi:
If we assume free data usage over WiFi, a straightforward
strategy to reduce cellular data costs is to proactively down-
load the most recent network status document as soon as
it is available. This has the downside of causing additional
traffic at the directory mirrors and will also increase energy
costs. Strategy B in Figure 1 explores this option.
Strategy C: Defer fetching network status on cellular:
Since mobile devices regularly move between WiFi and
cellular data, it may make sense to delay downloading the
network status document until just before expiry in the
hope that WiFi connectivity appears before a download over
the cellular network becomes necessary. Additionally, this
may reduce the total number of network status document
downloads. This strategy may cause spikes in download
requests on directory mirrors in the Tor network if many






















Figure 2. Average size of the compressed output of diff -d -e on
pairs of all microdescriptor consensus documents from 1 November to
30 November 2016, compared to the compressed size of the full network
status documents.
Strategy D: Download network status diffs: The network
status document is updated every hour, but only a small part
of it changes from hour to hour. Therefore, we consider
the potential benefits of downloading the difference in two
network status documents. This is not a new idea—a version
of this was implemented [7], [8] in 2014—but it is not yet
integrated into the main branch of Tor or available in Orbot.
To estimate potential savings from downloading differences
instead of full documents, we looked at all 720 consecutive
network status documents from November 2016 (UTC).
We compared documents pairwise by applying
diff -d -e and then gzip -9 to the output to
calculate the size of a diff. We calculated how the size of
the diff changed as the time period between the pairs of
documents increased. Figure 2 shows the average size of
the compressed difference between all pairs of documents,
grouped by the number of hours between the start of the
validity of the two documents. The knee in the curve at
18 hours is due to the fact that Tor relays update their
relay descriptors every 18 hours. The data shows that using
diffs can drastically reduce download size if time between
network status downloads is small. The diff between two
consecutive network status documents is a mere 6% of the
size of the full network status document; it is still 35%
smaller after 18 hours, reaching the size of a full network
status download only after 6 days. Thus, consensus diffs
can be particularly beneficial for devices that constantly
stay connected to the Tor network and frequently download
the consensus. To account for the overhead incurred by
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downloading the diffs, we add 17.6% to the sizes of
all compressed diffs for our model. We calculated this
percentage by comparing the average traffic incurred for a
consensus download in Section V-A with the average size
of compressed consensus documents from November 2016.
Strategy D in Figure 1 computes the cost savings on
cellular data if network status diffs followed the averages
found in Figure 2.
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous work has highlighted a scalability problem in
Tor’s design: every client needs up-to-date information on all
relays, resulting in a total bandwidth expenditure that grows
with the number of clients times the number of relays [9],
[10]. Several papers propose more scalable solutions using
peer-to-peer architectures [9], [11]–[14]. These approaches
are usually based on using distributed hash tables (DHTs)
and/or random walks letting clients find random relays on
demand without needing the entire list of relays. Mittal et
al. [10] proposed an alternative approach to improve Tor’s
scalability: keep the existing client-server architecture, and
letting clients obtain random relays from directory servers or
guard relays using private information retrieval techniques.
While the focus was to reduce the data usage from network
status downloads on the Tor network centrally, such tech-
niques also offer large advantages to mobile devices with
limited data usage requirements and energy constraints.
Loesing et al. [15] measured the time taken to complete
the steps involved in connecting to a hidden service. Lenhard
et al. [16] conducted similar experiments with similar results.
They also measured the time a Tor client takes to complete
the bootstrapping phase under low-bandwidth conditions.
Solberg and Bezem [17] measured various performance
characteristics of the Tor network and Tor hidden services,
including throughput, access time, connection latency, and
reliability, for both the public and a private Tor network.
Wiangsripanawan et al. [18] and Doswell et al. [19], [20]
looked at the impact of mobility on the performance of Tor in
client mode. They explored the problem of changing network
connectivity, and the resulting change in IP address, the
need to re-establish Tor circuits, and the loss in connectivity.
Wiangsripanawan et al. also considered location privacy.
To keep connections alive across changes of IP address,
they propose re-establishing a circuit to the same exit node.
Doswell et al. estimated the impact on throughput, and
proposed client throttling to reduce the amount of “wasted”
traffic, and the use of a trusted (private or public) bridge
relay to keep circuits open, allowing the client to quickly
reconnect to the circuits. Neither of these papers consider
the costs of running a hidden service from a mobile device.
Briar [21] is an open source app that uses Tor hidden
services to support instant messaging between smartphones
without using other cloud infrastructure or push notification
servers. They do not quantify the costs of running a hidden
service; the results from our paper provide support for the
introduction of network status diffs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the cellular data cost of maintaining
a Tor hidden service from a smartphone today is high, with
a median cost across all devices of 198 MiB. In the worst
case, we see devices with cellular data usage in excess of
600 MiB. Energy costs were also significant: we estimated
the network activity would cost at least 9.6% of battery
capacity on a Nexus One connected to the Internet via 3G
with a daily charge cycle.
We explored four strategies to reduce the cost of main-
taining a Tor hidden service on a smartphone: reconnect
to the same introduction points when the phone’s IP ad-
dress changes; proactively fetch network status on WiFi;
defer fetching network status on cellular connections; and
download network status diffs. When these four strategies
are combined, the result is a more reasonable total monthly
median cost of 61 MiB. However, there remains significant
work to do. Our experiments show that Google Cloud
Messaging costs in the order of 1 MiB per month, an order of
magnitude less than a Tor hidden service with all four of our
data reduction strategies deployed. Similarly, transmission of
a single 1 KiB message consumes significantly more over
Tor (between 3.8 KiB and 9.7 KiB of data; see Table II) as
compared with GCM (1.3 KiB; See Section V-D).
The introduction of Doze [22] in Android 6.0 makes
some form of privacy-preserving push notification service
all the more important. Doze is enabled when the handset is
stationary for a period of time, not charging and the screen
is off. When Doze is enabled, a handset conserves battery
life by suspending apps, including suspending background
tasks, network communication, alarms, and wake locks.
Consequently GCM is an essential developer tool if an app
needs to receive messages from an external source because
high-priority messages sent over the network to Google Play
Services are not affected by Doze.
Popular apps such as Facebook already allow users to con-
nect via Tor from their smartphone. However, they currently
lack support for push notifications for these connections.
Our work shows that, with some further work to Tor as
outlined in Section VI-B, using Tor for push notifications
may be acceptable for such users. Tor hidden services are
also likely to be useful to support direct phone-to-phone
communication in next-generation apps like Briar [21].
Scaleability is a concern if Tor hidden services become
popular for deploying push-notification services. If millions
of mobile devices start running a Tor hidden service, the
increased bandwidth requirements on the Tor network and
the large number of hidden service descriptors that need to
be managed by hidden service directories will require more
Tor relays to be deployed. This will in turn increase the size
of the network status document that needs to be downloaded
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to the devices regularly. Future work is therefore required
to develop more scalable anonymity networks.
DATASET
Data and source code used to produce the results in this
paper are available [23]. Data from Device Analyzer is
already available from the Device Analyzer project.
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